“Political Corruption in Eurasia: Understanding Collusion between States, Organized Crime and Business” is an in-depth study by Alexander Kupatadze about the political competitiveness of post-Soviet states and the effect that competitiveness has on collusion within the state. After the Soviet Union collapsed in the 1990s, state resources were sold off, and this process has affected the development of corruption in Eurasia. This process has left state resources in the control of actors who use those resources for self-serving purposes. The author focuses on political competition and the centralization of political power, as well as the influence that competition has had on the ways in which different post-Soviet states have fared after the redistribution process.
Non-competitive, centralized states are the most prevalent in the region, including Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. In such cases, the state is the primary actor and seeks collusion with private actors. For example, these states use organized crime for the benefit of the state or enforce collusive deals with the business elite, such as by purchasing court orders. Russia is the prime example of a centralized, non-competitive state. Former Russian president Boris Yeltsin was able to dismantle political competition and centralize Russia through military force and illicit agreements. Vladimir Putin further privatized state assets by installing high-ranking government officials in company boardrooms, a practice that the author notes can easily undermine transparency. Any anti-corruption campaigns in these states likely only serve to reassure the public of the government’s efforts, rather than truly to clean up the corruption occurring within the state.
Kupatadze categorizes other states as politically competitive and centralized. These states include Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Moldova, and Georgia. In these states, collusion occurs among political actors seeking to gain control of political power. In politically competitive states, politicians may use organized criminal groups to advance their political agendas, but the relationship between the state and organized crime is precarious. While political elites may use organized criminal groups to further political agendas, the criminal groups may organize to undermine those very political agendas. An example of this is prison riots in Georgia in 2006, in which organized criminal groups helped prisoners obtain weapons. In these states, the elite control the assets, which they use as bargaining power to gain or maintain favor with different factions. Anti-corruption campaigns in these states differ from those in non-competitive, centralized states because they may actually seek to curb corruption, albeit with political motivations.
The author asserts that post-Soviet states are distinct from other countries that share similar traits. Kupatadze notes that post-Soviet states consistently have had military support, which distinguishes them from countries in regions such as Latin America or Africa, where the military is composed of “independent or semi-independent actors.” In addition, the state is more involved in the private sector in post-Soviet states than it is in regions such as Latin America or Africa.
NOTE: This summary is produced by the Rule of Law Collaborative, not by the original author(s).