The surge of migrants arriving to the U.S.-Mexico border each month has ignited a debate over what factors have displaced millions of adults and unaccompanied minors throughout Central America. “Crime and Violence in Central America’s Northern Triangle: How U.S. Policy Responses Are Helping, Hurting and Can Be Improved,” edited by Eric L. Olson with contributions from Cristina Eguizábal, Christine Zaino, Matthew C. Ingram, Karise M. Curtis, Aaron Korthuis, and Nicholas Phillips, surveys the political, social and economic effects of crime and violence, the countries’ management of these crises, and the U.S. response through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). CARSI, a program developed by the U.S. Department of State, was designed to combat crime and violence, fight corruption, and “support the development of strong, capable and accountable Central American governments in the region.”
In this volume, the authors examine the rise in crime and violence in Central America’s Northern Triangle—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. For the first time, they argue, the United States has acknowledged that drug trafficking is not the sole reason for the rise in crime and migration. Further, they acknowledge that the United States’ reliance on illegal drugs and the war on drugs have increased gang violence and homicide rates such that aid programs are unsustainable and only mildly successful. Through interviews, archival research, and analyses of policies and programs, the authors argue that internal social and political conflicts within the Northern Triangle countries, the international drug trade, and record numbers of criminals deported from the United States to the Northern Triangle have caused the flight of migrants from the region. These features have led to “high homicide rates, rampant extortion, communities controlled by youth gangs, domestic violence, impunity for most crimes, as well as economic despair and lack of opportunity.” The fundamental question then, Olson surmises, is “whether the Northern Triangle countries are able to deal with these problems on their own or whether it will require significant and sustained support—financial, technical, and strategic—from the international community and especially the United States?”
Eguizábal determines that criminals deported from the U.S. to El Salvador saw a rise in drug and gang related activities, which were further exacerbated by the drug traffic re-directing its route through the region and into Mexico. The influence of gang activity, Olson and Zaino argue, permeate the region, “from a rise in homicides (revenge killings), domestic abuse, sexual violence and a weakened family structure that leads minors to cling to the ‘safety’ of gangs.” Eguizábal provides a detailed investigation of El Salvador’s social and political history, creating a complex narrative of the legacies of civil and economic strife that have led to crime, corruption and economic instability. She writes, that issues of violence and insecurity was initially a domestic problem rooted in deep inequality, ethnic and social discrimination. Additionally, she notes that El Salvador became globalized before it had time to “consolidate” political institutions. Such that free trade and migration led to “organized crime in all its manifestations.” Thus, U.S. aid programs in the country have been influenced by the “war on drugs” paradigm. The Obama administration has resolved to focus on institution building and violence prevention. Though somewhat successful, Eguizábal argues that it is not just sufficient that the U.S. accept “co-responsibility” for its part in creating the problem, neither is it enough that the host country provides input about these programs, drive coordination with the donor community, and increases transparency while working with the U.S. but also, she argues, the U.S. “must also accept the obligation to contribute to its solution beyond providing foreign assistance.
No other country has received more CARSI aid than Guatemala, Phillips states. The country’s civil war from 1960-1996 war, compounded with the rise of criminals and the redirection of the drug trade route, “made Guatemala a hotbed in security, the war on drugs, and its political and economic force.” Phillips examines CARSI’s programs in Guatemala and their mixed results in achieving their goals. Guatemala’s extremely low tax rate and legislators’ apparent unwillingness to generate new revenue hinders any future security aid from the international community. Phillips argues this is due in part to the government’s ambivalence to pay for the programs, which would result in a 3% tax raise, after INL and USAID leave the region. If the U.S. were to provide another aid package to the country, Phillips argues it should come with strict conditions to raise taxes earmarked for security investment. This will provide an incentive for bold reforms and equip the country with the funds and willingness to move forward.
Internal strife and external factors have created a “hot-bed” of insecurity to varying degrees within the Northern Triangle. Korthuis highlights CARSI-related programming in Honduras, the country with the highest homicide rate in the world, according to the United Nations. Despite numerous reform efforts, Honduras has struggled with a weak law enforcement capacity and persistent corruption, making CARSI’s stated goals particularly relevant to the country’s current context. Korthuis concludes that, after five years since CARSI’s inception in Honduras, the country is still plagued by drug-trafficking, corruption pervades the justice sector, and “urban violence continues unabated.” Despite these abysmal accounts, there are limited reform measures taking place within law enforcement in the fight against drug-traffickers.
The volume has shown that “corruption is rampant throughout police and justice institutions…and inefficient, poorly trained, and unprofessional forces are a common and constant challenge in any attempt to combat crime and drug trafficking.” For these reasons and more, Olson argues that “these factors provide convincing evidence that a multinational and multidimensional approach is needed to address Central America’s security crisis, one that requires determined engagement by the nations of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras themselves but cannot be successfully waged alone and in isolation.” Though CARSI has been helpful, it has also presented some impediments to lasting change. As Olson notes, CARSI funds have improved the criminal courts and police anti-gang units, but they have also failed to produce “an exemplary police precinct,” among other factors. He affirms that, “The solution of the public security crisis in the region must be multilevel, multi sectorial, involve multiple actors, multinational, transnational, long term and require a significant financial commitment.”
NOTE: This summary is produced by the Rule of Law Collaborative, not by the original author(s).